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978-2226179142 
 
Paul Veyne is an historian of the Greco-Roman world, and was a long-time friend of Michel 
Foucault.  He was also an important source for Foucault’s thinking about the ancient world 
and its practices, both socio-political, but especially the history of its mentalités.  The signs of 
Veyne’s impact on Foucault abound, particularly in the last two volumes of The History of 
Sexuality, and, indeed, in all the writings, conferences, lectures, and interviews in the period 
following his ‚ethical‛ turn.  While this book is not an account of their discussions over a 
period of many years, Veyne surely had a privileged vantage point from which to observe the 
trajectory of his friend’s thinking.   
 
Veyne reads Foucault as a later day sceptic, an heir to Montaigne, for example, but not a 
nihilist, inasmuch as he not only acknowledges, but also focuses on, the existence of practices 
of human freedom, even as he rejects any religious, metaphysical, or transcendental 
foundation for them.  Not only are practices themselves transformed over and over through-
out history, amorous or penal practices, to take two examples that so interested Foucault, but 
both the very meaning of those practices – pleasure, for example – as well as the conditions 
and the procedures or ‚rules‛ for the construction of true statements about them, undergo 
constant transformation: ‚Ontologically speaking, there exist only variations, the trans-
historical theme just being a term devoid of meaning: Foucault is a nominalist, like Max Weber 
and any good historian.‛ (19)  Practices, sexual or penal, for example, surely exist, but we 
grasp, ‚see,‛ or know them only on the bases of the ideas that the discourse of a given epoch 
permits us to have, that the discursive rules for making truth claims allow.  Veyne is both 
careful and determined to point out that Foucault’s scepticism is not self-refuting, that 
Foucault is not contradicting himself, that he is not simply saying ‚the truth is that there is no 
truth.‛ What he is saying, according to Veyne, is that objects, things, events, social relations, 
do not exist ‚before any discourse,‛ as ‚a pre-discursive referent,‛ apart from any perspective.  
(75)  Foucauldian scepticism, then, can be best seen as a perspectivism, the Nietzschean prove-
nance of which seems clear.      
 
Indeed, Veyne introduces this volume by evoking the image of the human being as a fish in a 
bowl: the person sees himself outside the bowl looking in, thinking she sees things as they 
‛really‛ are, yet acknowledging that her thinking is delimited by existence within it.  ‚The 
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sceptic is at one and the same time an observer, outside the bowl< and one of the< fish.‛ (11) 
For Veyne, Foucault’s scepticism puts him in the company (limiting ourselves to modern 
thinkers) of Nietzsche, William James, Wittgenstein, Ian Hacking, and Richard Rorty: 
‚knowledge cannot be the faithful mirror of reality.‛ (14)  But Foucauldian scepticism, accor-
ding to Veyne, pertains to the historicity, of the discourse, of the épistémè, of the fish bowl, so 
to speak; it is ‚<a scepticism about general ideas (but about them alone: not about 
singularities such as the innocence of Dreyfus or the exact date of the battle of Teutoburg).‛ 
(24)  But, of course, it does not mean, for Foucault, that there is no ‚truth.‛  Rather, as Veyne 
puts it: ‚False generalities and discourses change through time; but, in each epoch, they pass 
for truths, pass so well that the truth is reduced to dire vrai, to speaking in conformity to what 
is acknowledged to be true, and which will make one smile a century later.‛ (24)1  Indeed, 
Veyne tells us that Foucault hoped that his ideas would have an impact on the writing of 
history, that historians would acknowledge ‚that everything was historical, even truth.‛ (37)  
 
But, Veyne hastens to add, Foucault is not a relativist, a fan of the linguistic turn of philosophy 
and literary studies of the ‘60’s, for which interpretation is infinite.  Rather,  ‚<a text is not its 
own interpretation, Foucault’s basic method is to correctly understand what the author of the 
text wanted to say in his own time.‛ (27)  That said, however, don’t we all read that text, any 
text, and see any event, ensconced within our own historically specific fish bowl?  While that 
circumscribes what it is possible to ‚see,‛ some fish bowls, for historically contingent reasons, 
create possibilities that are foreclosed in others, including the prospect of exploding the limits 
of a given discourse, and its truth game.  Veyne points to the emergence of Christianity and 
then of Islam, as historical examples of just such transformative events, adding that ‚we only 
change fish bowls to find ourselves in a new fish bowl.‛ (45)  The bowl itself is what Foucault 
designated as ‚an historical a priori,‛ which itself will be transformed, though the conditions 
for a transformation of a discourse, and of the dispositif to which it is linked, cannot be 
reduced to any one causal factor or an overarching pattern: ‚<discourses do not succeed one 
another according to the logic of a dialectic < and are not judged by a transcendental tribunal, 
between them there are only relations of fact, not of right, they supplant one another, their 
relations are those of strangers, of rivals.  Struggle, and not reason, is an essential relation of 
thought.‛ (58)  Indeed, each such transformation, like the discourse and dispositif that is trans-
formed, is singular.   
 
So too is subjectivity.  There is no a-historical subject, that creature of philosophical anthro-
pology.  But there are subjects; indeed an historical succession of them, and Veyne wants to 
show that for his friend, if one wants to grasp the subject as he/she is in a given civilization or 
‚world,‛ then ‚it’s necessary to study history, the economy, society, linguistics and the whole 
dispositif which makes of him what he is at a given moment.‛ (66)  For Veyne, Foucault’s 
provocative ending of his The Order of Things, ‚that man would be erased like a face drawn in 
sand at the edge of the sea,‛ was not a rejection of subjectivity, but just of the hypostasis of an 
                                                 
1 As Veyne points out, Foucault told him that Nietzsche ‚<was not a philosopher of truth, but of dire-vrai.‛ 
(140) 
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a-temporal Subject.  Indeed, I would advance the claim that as early as 1966, then, we can 
already see the outlines of what would later become – for the final Foucault – ‚the invention of 
self.‛  
 
However before turning to Veyne’s discussion of Foucault’s ethical turn, his views about the 
invention of self, I want to address a point that Veyne makes about Foucault’s conception of 
‚man‛ in relation to the Heideggerian vision – a point that raises questions about the possible 
limits of Foucauldian scepticism too.2  In the last essay that he published, in April 1984, a 
reworking of his introduction to the English translation of Canguilhem’s The Normal and the 
Pathological, Foucault spoke of error [errer] and making mistakes as hallmarks of human being, 
seen as – in Veyne’s words – an ‚erratic animal,‛ (113) both in the sense of inconsistent and 
subject to error.  While the variety of truth games or regimes of truth in human history might 
seem to confirm such a judgment, is this an indication that Foucault has found a ‚true truth‛ 
[vérité vraie] about the human condition or simply that we humans are all ‚prisoners of a 
discourse and of a dispositif, and free by half‛? (112)  I leave this as a question just because its 
pursuit would take us beyond the limits of Veyne’s own text.  What did animate Foucault, 
though, according to Veyne, was the conviction that humankind now ‚could live without 
myths, without religion, and without philosophy, without general truths about itself.  Such 
was the Nietzschean revolution, of which he believed himself to be the continuator.‛ (126)  
Yet, Foucault also recognized that he could not extricate himself from, or rise above, his own 
‚world of discourse; the truths of genealogy, archaeology, are seen in the ‘perspective’ of the 
moment.‛ (129)  
 
Now back to the ‚subject,‛ to subjectivity.  Despite the claims that Foucault was a determinist, 
a structuralist, for whom the subject virtually did not exist, Veyne reads the dispositif as an 
‚obstacle against which the subject manifests itself.‛ (144)  Indeed, the subject is both con-
stituted within a complex of power-knowledge, and yet has the freedom [liberté] to resist it, 
though this subject is, of course, as Veyne tells us, neither a-historical, sovereign, nor natural: 
‚< he is shaped in each epoch by the dispositif and the discourse of the time *and+ by the 
reactions of his individual freedom...‛ (154)  It is here that Veyne begins to speak of Foucault’s 
ethical turn around 1980, where to his earlier focus on knowledge and power, he now adds a 
focus on the subject.  Veyne uses the tem subjectivation to designate all the diverse modes in 
which the subject can, and has been constituted historically, and the term esthétisation [aesthe-
ticization+ to designate the ‚transformation of self by oneself.‛ (156)  Rather than engage in a 
terminological dispute here, I would interject that Veyne is, indeed, acknowledging the 
importance of clearly distinguishing between modes of self-constitution primarily as various 
forms of assujettissement and what the final Foucault designated as ‚invention of self,‛ 
though elements of both are empirically present in varying degrees.  What Veyne designates 
                                                 
2 In additions to his animus towards Heidegger, political and philosophical (the latter based on his view of 
the German thinker as committed to Absolutes), including his conviction that Dasein is the shepherd of 
being, Veyne also claims that Heidegger had virtually no influence on Foucault, other than to lead him to a 
reading of Nietzsche.   
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as ‚aestheticization‛ is, as he points out, nonetheless the child of its time, a possibility found in 
a determinate culture, not just invented at will.  Michel Foucault saw our epoch, our culture, 
as one in which the breakdown of the authority of moral codes, and the modes of 
subjectification linked to them, has created an opening – though no more than that –  for the 
emergence of an ‚aesthetic of existence,‛ for a new invention of self.  Paul Veyne’s 
interpretation of his friend’s thinking shows us how important Foucault can be in contributing 
to, in ‚aiding *such+ a spontaneous process.‛ (186)    
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